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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The only way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by 
practice at sea, under all the conditions which would have to be met if 
war existed.”1  The men and women of the Navy who serve on seagoing 
warships understand this maxim all too well.  They experience the hard-
ships of going to sea, primarily leaving family and home for extended 
periods of time, just as Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet did a century ago.  
Family separation is even more difficult to withstand when it is endured 
not to fulfill the Navy’s primary mission of maritime dominance through 
force, but to prepare for the time when such force may be required.  In-
deed, considering that today’s Navy has seen little in the way of tradi-
tional maritime warfare, it is fitting that Chief Justice Roberts incorpo-
rated President Roosevelt’s quotation in an important decision concern-
ing the balance between military training and environmental protection.2 
Military training objectives and environmental protection have been 
at odds for years.3  One can argue, not unconvincingly, that military 
training by land, air, or sea is inherently antithetical to environmental 
protection.4  The essential goal of the armed forces—to protect the sove-
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 1. 42 CONG. REC. 67, 81 (1907) (statement of President Theodore Roosevelt). 
 2. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 382 (2008). 
 3. Environmental protection groups have sought judicial injunctions against the military since 
1977, when the Navy was sued over the use of bombing ranges on the Hawaiian island of Ka-
ho’olawe. See Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Haw. 1977), rev’d, 602 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
 4. See Nancy L. Bethurem, Environmental Destruction in the Name of National Security: Will 
the Old Paradigm Return in the Wake of September 11?, 8 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
109 (2002).  Ms. Bethurem describes the physical, cultural, and sociological impact military training 
230 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:229 
reign territories of the United States—requires each uniformed service to 
be ready to engage hostile enemies in any locale with destructive impact.  
This need for readiness does not mean that the military necessarily and 
institutionally disregards potential environmental impacts when planning 
training operations.  However, the emergence of strong national envi-
ronmental protection laws presents a fundamental conflict for military 
leadership.  How does the Department of Defense (DOD) reconcile the 
laudable goals of these environmental protection laws with the need for 
realistic military training? 
The term “operational encroachment” has been used to encapsulate 
the description of this often abrasive relationship.5  Operational en-
croachment occurs when the court system issues injunctive relief against 
the DOD in the interest of promoting compliance with environmental 
laws.6  The armed forces have repeatedly encountered the issue of opera-
tional encroachment when conducting training scenarios; from California 
to North Carolina, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, the Army, Air Force, Navy, 
and Marine Corps have been forced to significantly alter or altogether 
cease the manner in which they had previously trained.7 
Most recently, the Navy was embroiled in a legal battle while at-
tempting to carry out extensive battle group training exercises off the 
coast of southern California.8  The primary dispute concerned the use of 
mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar and the potential deleterious effects 
that MFA sonar has on marine mammals.9  The plaintiffs successfully 
obtained a preliminary injunction requiring the Navy to implement sev-
eral restrictive mitigation measures.  The case reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court in October of 2008 for final adjudication.10 
What could have sparked a genuine factual investigation—of 
whether the Navy’s use of MFA sonar posed a threat to marine life and 
what depth of MFA sonar training was required by the Navy—instead 
                                                                                                             
exercises have on the environment by providing examples spanning from digging trenches to drop-
ping bombs.  Id. 
 5. Eric Montalvo, Operational Encroachment: Woodpeckers and Their Congressmen, 20 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 219, 223 (2002).  The author does not claim to have coined the phrase, 
but it has since become widely used. 
6. Id. 
 7. See Colonel E.G. Willard et al., Environmental Law and National Security: Can Existing 
Exemptions in Environmental Laws Preserve DOD Training and Operational Prerogatives Without 
New Legislation?, 54 A.F. L. REV. 65 (2004).  Encroachment can occur when the protection of an 
endangered species or wildlife habitat affects military training.  Id.  Two well-known examples of 
operational encroachment include the protection of the Desert Tortoise in California and of the Red-
cockaded Woodpecker in North Carolina.  Id. 
 8. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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sparked a legal shell game that did not effectively resolve the underlying 
issue of balancing these conflicting priorities.  The Legislature’s failure 
to create a system that adequately balances these priorities has resulted in 
unpredictable and costly lawsuits. 
Most environmental laws contain provisions to allow for exemp-
tions in the interest of national security, but it is difficult to state a defini-
tive policy regarding these exemptions because the legal requirements 
are inconsistent.11  There is no clear statutory scheme to dictate who 
grants an exemption, under what circumstances an exemption is appro-
priate, or what the military needs to do to obtain an exemption.  To pro-
mote efficiency and predictability, and more importantly to clearly define 
the license of the armed forces in carrying out daily training exercises, 
Congress should resolve these inconsistencies.  By reforming current 
environmental laws to establish a uniform standard and by creating a 
new commission to apply that standard, a balance between national secu-
rity and protecting the environment can be attained. 
Part II of this Comment analyzes current federal environmental pro-
tection laws to illustrate the inconsistent approach to providing national 
security exemptions.  This inconsistent approach underscores the vast 
potential for litigation.  Part III further exposes the potential for litigation 
by discussing the recent Supreme Court decision in Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.12  Finally, Part IV proposes several possible 
solutions for resolving existing inconsistencies and inefficiencies to 
achieve a proper balance between environmental protection and appro-
priate levels of military training. 
II.  NATIONAL SECURITY EXEMPTIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
Armed with a host of environmental laws that contain citizen suit 
provisions, environmental protection groups wield the threat of injunc-
tive relief when it appears that non-wartime military action may cause 
environmental harm.  Foreseeing the potential for revolving door litiga-
tion between the government and activist groups, Congress created vari-
ous mandatory exceptions and exemptions for military actions that are in 
the interest of national security.  However, the extent and form of such 
exemptions are anything but uniform. 
A.  Existing National Security Exemptions 
While most federal environmental statutes have some form of ex-
emption for issues of national security, the following are particularly ap-
                                                 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. 129 S. Ct. 365. 
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plicable to military training scenarios and are most likely to enter the 
dialogue in operational encroachment cases.13 
1.  The Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act allows the President to issue regulations that ex-
empt any equipment of the armed forces from compliance with the Act 
for three years if the President finds the exemption to be in the para-
mount interest of the United States.14  The President holds a nearly iden-
tical power under the Clean Water Act (CWA).15 
2.  The Endangered Species Act 
Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a unique statutory 
scheme is in place where the Endangered Species Committee shall ex-
empt any agency’s action if the Secretary of Defense finds that the action 
is necessary for national security.16  While this specific exemption has 
never been invoked, the Secretary’s exemption power seems unlimited.17 
3.  The Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
Another statute with a national security exemption, and one that has 
recently been used in an attempt to enjoin military training exercises, is 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).18  After both the Navy and Air 
Force had been separately precluded from using a bombing range out of 
concern for birds protected under the Act, Congress wrote into the Fiscal 
Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act that the MBTA did not apply to 
military readiness activities.19  This temporary fix applies until the Secre-
tary of Interior writes regulations codifying the exemption or until a sub-
sequent Congress repeals the exemption.20 
                                                 
 13. Several statutes that also have national security exemptions built in are not discussed be-
cause they do not particularly apply to military training scenarios.  These include the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9620(j) 
(2006); the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629, 2621 (2006); and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992, 6961(a) (2006). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431, 7418(b) (2006). 
 15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1376, 1323(a) (2006). 
 16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544, 1536(j) (2006). 
 17. Willard et al., supra note 7, at 73–74. 
 18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712, 704 (2006). 
 19. Willard et al., supra note 7, at 77–78. 
 20. Id. 
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4.  The Marine Mammal Protection Act 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) likewise contains an 
exemption for military activities.21  If the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that military action would violate the Act by taking a marine 
mammal and that such action is necessary for national defense, the Sec-
retary may issue a two-year exemption.22  Within thirty days of granting 
the exemption, the Secretary must report the terms of and reasons for the 
exemption to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.23 
5.  The Coastal Zone Management Act 
Under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), when federal 
agencies plan to take action that affects any land or water use or natural 
resource of the coastal zone, they are required to comply with applicable 
state laws to the greatest extent possible.24  The CZMA allows for an ex-
emption that can be utilized for military activities.25  After a federal court 
finds that a federal activity is noncompliant with a state coastal zone 
management plan, the President may exempt the activity if it is of para-
mount interest to the United States.26 
B.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
Passed in 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)27 is 
a unique statute, one that is largely policy centered, as opposed to regula-
tory, and one that commands agencies to undertake informed decision-
making with regard to environmental effects as opposed to providing a 
list of prohibitions and penalties.28  Enacted to “declare a national policy 
which will encourage harmony between man and his environment,”29 
NEPA has since been described as “the most successful environmental 
law in the world and the most disappointing.”30  Initially, NEPA was 
thought to have little regulatory force, but through an influential decision 
                                                 
 21. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407, 1371(f) (2006). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. §§ 1451–1464, 1456(c)(1)(A).. 
 25. Id. § 1456(c)(1)(B). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006). 
 28. Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 204–207 (1998). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
 30. Oliver A. Houck, Is that All? A Review of the National Environmental Policy Act, An 
Agenda for the Future, by Lynton Keith Caldwell, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 173 (2000) 
(book review). 
234 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:229 
by the D.C. Circuit31 and a set of regulations written by the President’s 
Council on Environmental Quality in 1978,32 the Act was given some 
bite.33 
Two important aspects of NEPA are relevant to issues of operation-
al encroachment.  First, NEPA requires agencies to craft an environmen-
tal impact statement (EIS) when considering an action that will signifi-
cantly affect the environment.34  Second, NEPA created the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), an executive three-member panel respon-
sible for reporting to the President on a host of environmental issues and 
assisting in interpreting and enforcing NEPA.35 
A notable exception to the previously discussed environmental 
laws, NEPA provides no statutory exemption for issues of national secu-
rity.36  However, it provides a close equivalent.  Where emergency cir-
cumstances require action that will have a significant environmental im-
pact but preclude construction of an EIS, the agency may consult with 
the CEQ to make alternative arrangements.37  Thus, while not the same 
as an executive waiver, the President still retains some ability to circum-
vent the requirements of the Act through the CEQ. 
C.  Problems with the Current Framework of National Security 
Exemptions 
From the military’s perspective, there are many problems asso-
ciated with the way exemptions are currently implemented under the 
previously discussed Acts.38  The most obvious problem with the current 
                                                 
 31. In an emphatic opinion written by Judge Skelly Wright, the D.C. Circuit reviewed several 
actions under NEPA and ensured that the legislative aims of NEPA would be enforced.  Calvert 
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 32. Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (May 24, 1977).  This Executive Order pro-
vided the committee, previously empowered to issue only advisory guidelines, with regulatory pow-
er.  Id. 
 33. See Houck, supra note 30, at 181–85.  The author argues that the Act as originally written 
was too ambiguous to provide any judicial guidance—possibly too ambiguous to pass congressional 
vote.  Id.  The author further argues that the current Supreme Court clearly views NEPA as no more 
than a public disclosure mechanism that threatens the autonomy of agency decision-making.  Id. at 
185.  Perhaps foreshadowing the result in Winter, the author points out that NEPA is zero for twen-
ty-two in the halls of the Supreme Court.  Id. at 185–86. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.  The EIS must include detailed statements explaining the environmental 
impact and adverse environmental effects of the proposed action, alternatives to the proposed action, 
and any irretrievable commitments of resources involved in the proposed action.  Id.  A completed 
EIS is subject to public disclosure in accordance with the Federal APA.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344. 
 36. See supra Part II.A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370. 
 37. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2006). 
 38. See Willard et al., supra note 7, at 87.  The authors argue that it is infeasible to obtain ex-
emptions for regular training operations.  Id.  But see Hope Babcock, National Security and Envi-
ronmental Laws: A Clear and Present Danger?, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 117–19 (2007). 
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exemption framework is that it generally requires intervention from the 
highest level of the Executive Branch.39  This problem is closely related 
to the next.  The current system is suited to one-time, isolated events that 
are irreconcilable with environmental laws.  When such isolated events 
arise, it may be appropriate to require the President to intervene and bal-
ance the importance of the military mission with the potential environ-
mental impact.  However, operational encroachment rarely involves a 
one-time, isolated event; it is far more likely to occur with regular and 
recurring training events.  In recognition of the unsuitability of current 
exemptions to one-time scenarios, the DOD has commented that, while 
being “a valuable hedge against unexpected future emergencies, [the cur-
rent statutory scheme of exemptions] cannot provide the legal basis for 
the Nation’s everyday military readiness activities . . . .”40  The result is 
“death by a thousand cuts” from “having to employ these exemptions on 
a case-by-case basis.”41 
Other military concerns are notable, including the potential for re-
lease of classified information due to exemption reporting require-
ments;42 so-called “negative training”;43 increased wear and tear when 
equipment is shipped to locations suitable for an exercise;44 and the sig-
nificant financial costs involved in attempting to comply with exemption 
requirements.45 
While most environmental statute exemptions name the same grant-
ing authority (the President) and invoke the same standard (paramount 
interest to the United States), there are differences among the statutes 
that introduce inconsistencies and inefficiencies to the process.  For ex-
ample, the ESA, the MBTA, and the MMPA all require action by the 
Secretary of Defense rather than the President.46  Some exemptions last 
for one year, others for two years, yet each exemption is limited to one 
                                                 
 39. See, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431, 7418(b) (2006); the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006); the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1464, 
1456(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 40. Willard et al., supra note 7, at 87.  See also Critical Challenges Confronting National 
Security—Continuing Encroachment Threatens Force Readiness: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Government Reform, 107th Cong. (2002) (statements of Raymond F. DuBois, Jr., Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment & Paul Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense, Readiness), [hereinafter Hearing on Continuing Encroachment]. 
 41. Willard et al., supra note 7, at 87. 
 42. Babcock, supra note 38, at 118. 
 43. Hearing on Continuing Encroachment, supra note 40.  Negative training is the result of 
artificialities that are forced into training scenarios, which reinforce tactics contrary to what will be 
employed in real combat.  Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
46. See supra Part II.A. 
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specific planned event.47  Exemptions have different reporting require-
ments.48  And most importantly, NEPA—arguably the most powerful of 
the environmental laws—contains no exemption at all.49 
The current framework can hardly satisfy environmentalists either.  
While the military may worry that the standard of “paramount interest” 
that is most often invoked lacks the requisite specificity to effectively 
guide judicial scrutiny,50 the same ambiguity may explain the judiciary’s 
tendency to grant significant deference to military decisions.51  The statu-
tory language allowing exemptions is broad and vague, permitting a wide 
array of military action to be included where perhaps Congress intended 
something much narrower.52  Furthermore, proponents of further transpa-
rency regarding exemptions and of limiting deference to military deci-
sion-making cannot rely on the vast enforcement potential of NEPA be-
cause its effectiveness in the courts is dubious.53 
While the application of each environmental law poses interesting 
questions, it is this contradictory view of NEPA—a broad and powerful 
statute without a national security exemption, yet one that lacks judicial 
backing—that made the litigation of Winter v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council54 so compelling for the future resolution of operational 
encroachment issues. 
III.  THE COLLISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEFENSE CONCERNS 
One does not have to look far to see a clear example of the prob-
lems with the status quo.  Winter shows how citizen suits can be used to 
halt military training and move environmental issues to the forefront of 
                                                 
 47. For example, under the ESA, exemptions are presumed to be permanent, 16 U.S.C. § 
1536(h)(2) (2006); CWA exemptions last for one year, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006); and MMPA 
exemptions last for two years, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f)(2)(B) (2006). 
 48. The CZMA contains no specific reporting requirements.  16 U.S.C. § 1456 (2006).  Under 
the CWA, the President must report all exemptions to Congress every January.  33 U.S.C. § 1323 
(2006).  The MMPA requires the Secretary of Defense to report to a congressional committee within 
thirty days of granting an exemption.  See supra Part II.A.4. 
 49. See supra Part II.B.  It is somewhat ironic that the loudest champion of NEPA’s inception 
was Washington Senator Henry M. Jackson, whose name would later be used for the Ohio-class 
submarine SSBN-731.  While the USS Henry M. Jackson is not equipped with MFA sonar, it is safe 
to say that using NEPA to enjoin the use of MFA sonar runs contrary to the mission and goals of the 
submarine force. 
 50. Babcock, supra note 38, at 118. 
 51. Id. at 147–50.  See also Julie G. Yap, Just Keep Swimming: Guiding Environmental Ste-
wardship Out of the Riptide of National Security, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1289, 1337 (2004). 
 52. Babcock, supra note 38, at 151. 
 53. Yap, supra note 51, at 1298 (“[t]he history of judicial deference to the military’s declara-
tions of national security concerns makes NEPA an ineffective tool for communities” to stop major 
military actions). 
 54. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
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legal and media focus.55  This Part will provide a brief discussion of the 
military’s history with environmental litigation, in particular with regards 
to NEPA, to provide a context from which Winter can be fully appre-
ciated. 
A.  Historical Military Compliance with Environmental Statutes 
As a result of unclear congressional intent regarding sovereign im-
munity and a national desire to win the Cold War at all costs, for decades 
the military seemed immune to suit for environmental damage.56  The 
1990s, however, signaled significant changes to the culture of eco-
consciousness within the DOD.57  The close of the Cold War allowed 
senior civilian defense leadership to state goals of environmental protec-
tion and good faith compliance with the regulations and restrictions 
placed upon other federal agencies.58  At the same time, sound environ-
mental policy was advanced as a supporting tenet of national security 
rather than an irreconcilable difference.59  Not unlike the current empha-
sis on renewable energy to lower dependence on foreign oil, the argu-
ment that resource scarcity can lead to ethnic conflicts, massive migra-
tions of peoples, or insurgencies has been critically tied to the defenseof 
the United States and its allies.60 
To be sure, the shift in focus at the DOD was not driven solely by a 
newfound ecological altruism.  At the same time that the DOD began to 
shift some of its priorities to focus on environmental stewardship, law-
suits were filed under various citizen suit statutes to force compliance on 
the military.61 
Despite actions within the DOD such as the creation and appoint-
ment of a Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Environmental Security) 
and the publishing of a comprehensive environmental strategy,62 efforts 
                                                 
 55. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Court Sides With Navy in Dispute Over Sonar and Whales, CNN, 
Nov. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/11/12/navy.sonar.whales/ (last visited July 
26, 2009); Juliet Eilperin & Jerry Markon, Justices Revoke Limits on Navy Use of Sonar, 
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 13, 2008, at A4. 
 56. See Donald N. Zillman, Environmental Protection and the Mission of the Armed Forces, 65 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 314 (1997) (reviewing STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1996)). 
 57. Bethurem, supra note 4, at 114–15. 
 58. Id. at 114–18. 
 59. Id. at 114 (quoting Seth Shulman, Operation Restore Earth, ENV’T, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 38). 
 60. See generally Sanford E. Gaines, Sustainable Development and National Security, 30 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321 (2006) (discussing the argument that environmental factors 
are intimately tied to issues of national security). 
 61. See Bethurem, supra note 4. 
 62. Id. at 115–16.  The DOD established an environmental program with four pillars that fo-
cused on restoration from past contamination, compliance with environmental statutes, reduction in 
pollution, and preservation of natural resources.  Id. 
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to force the military into environmental stewardship were mounting on 
Capitol Hill.63  For the first time, operational encroachment was being 
discussed with the Legislature in an effort to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between military training needs and environmental protection.64 
In May of 2001, the U.S. House Committee on Government Affairs 
held hearings to discuss the effects of operational encroachment on mili-
tary readiness and training.65  After hearing testimony from several mili-
tary leaders regarding the detrimental effects of operational encroach-
ment, the Committee issued a letter to President Bush stating that the 
availability of realistic military training was eroding and that the Admin-
istration needed to address the issue to maintain force readiness.66 
Perhaps as a counter-response to the Committee’s findings, the next 
month, Representative Bob Filner proposed the Military Environmental 
Responsibility Act, H.R. 2154, to the House.67  The bill would have elim-
inated any exemption, exception, or waiver for the military in any state 
or federal environmental statute, placing the military on the same plane 
as any private individual or corporation.68 
Like most issues, it is clear that members of the House were split on 
how to approach military compliance with environmental protection 
laws.  What appeared to be a mounting conflict was soon derailed, how-
ever, as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, enhanced the na-
tion’s focus on military readiness.  As the President repeatedly briefed 
the United States on the pending war on terrorism, it appeared that a “pa-
radigm shift” had occurred in the United States; the ground swelling of 
patriotism and support for U.S. troops reached levels unseen in over a 
generation.69  A nation at war does not have the heart or desire to impact 
military training at home.70 
Even as public support for the military has remained at extremely 
high levels, the unpopularity of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has les-
                                                 
 63. Id. at 120–22. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 120.  That same month, the U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Forces Committee 
and Military Readiness Subcommittee also discussed the problems associated with encroachment.  
Id. at 122 n.73. 
 66. Id. at 122. 
 67. Id. at 123. Representative Filner represents San Diego, California, an area with a very 
strong military presence and community support for environmental protection.  Representative Bob 
Filner—Biography, http://www.house.gov/filner/biography.htm. 
 68. Bethurem, supra note 4, at 123. 
 69. Id. at 126. 
 70. Id. at 126–28.  The author argues that where the military once was viewed as a nuisance, it 
has regained its national security “trump card.”  Id.  Comparing post-9/11 U.S. patriotism to the 
1940s, the author states, “During World War II, it would have been impossible to curb General Pat-
ton’s tanks because of excessive air pollution or to stop General MacArthur’s beach assaults because 
of threats to endangered species.  Winning the war was foremost.”  Id. 
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sened the resolve to remain committed to high levels of military readi-
ness at any cost.  The Military Environmental Responsibility Act, forgot-
ten immediately after the 9/11 attacks, has been reintroduced by Rep. 
Filner as H.R. 672 and is currently with the House Armed Services Sub-
committee on Readiness.71  Whether it gains any traction with the Legis-
lature remains to be seen. 
B.  Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
It is in this post-9/11 atmosphere that the case Winter v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council72 takes shape. 
1.  Factual Background 
Naval forces based on the West Coast routinely deploy to the west-
ern Pacific and the Middle East, typically with an aircraft carrier or am-
phibious landing ship as the central warship and with three to five ac-
companying surface combatants.73  Prior to deploying, each strike group 
must complete integrated training exercises during which the group is 
certified in various forms of warfare, including antisubmarine opera-
tions.74  These training missions are crucial; without certification, strike 
groups are unable to deploy, affecting the operational rotation of other 
strike groups, or worse, hindering the nation’s readiness for critical mis-
sions.75 
The Navy and Marine Corps have used the southern California op-
erating areas (SOCAL) for these certifying exercises for over forty years 
because they compose the only location on the West Coast allowing the 
military to simulate every aspect of certification necessary for these 
large-scale operations.76 
One critical aspect of deployment certification is antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW).77  To detect quiet diesel-electric submarines, such as 
                                                 
 71. After a reintroduced bill died in the 110th Congress, Rep. Filner reintroduced it yet again 
for the 111th Congress.  GovTrack.us, 111th Congress, H.R. 672: Military Environmental Responsi-
bility Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-672 (last viewed July 6, 2009). 
 72. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
 73. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, at 3–4, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 
365 (2008) (No. 07-1239). 
 74. Id. at 4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 370. 
 77. During strike group certification, accompanying ships must protect the high value unit 
(HVU) (typically an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship) from attack, in addition to support-
ing the HVU in conducting its primary mission.  Deployments to the western Pacific and Middle 
East place HVUs in the way of several nations that operate modern diesel-electric submarines.  The 
advantage of nuclear-powered submarines, such as those operated by the U.S. Navy, is range and the 
sustained capability to remain submerged.  Unlike nuclear-powered submarines, however, diesel 
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those operated by potentially adversarial countries,78 warships rely on the 
use of MFA sonar.  The principle behind active sonar is simple, even if 
the implementation may be complex.79  Varying levels of sound are emit-
ted into the ocean, those sound waves reverberate off of items such as the 
ocean floor, mines, ice floats, ships, or submarines, and the return rever-
berations are received by the emitting ship.  The sonar returns are 
processed and analyzed to create a picture of the ocean environment.80  
In this manner, warships can use active sonar not only for submarine de-
tection but also for contact avoidance, sea floor mapping, and ice avoid-
ance.81  MFA sonar is specifically designed to enhance the detection ca-
pabilities of warships, particularly in detecting modern, nearly silent di-
esel-electric submarines.82 
The Navy scheduled a series of fourteen training exercises in 
SOCAL to run from February 2007 to January 2009.83  In preparation for 
these exercises, the government took several steps to attempt compliance 
with environmental statutes.  First, the Navy determined that the use of 
MFA sonar during the exercises would not affect the California coastal 
zone and submitted a “consistency determination” to the California 
Coastal Commission pursuant to the CZMA.84  Next, the Secretary of 
Defense issued a two-year National Defense Exemption under the 
MMPA for the use of MFA sonar in these exercises, citing the need to 
use MFA sonar in the interest of national defense.85  Under the ESA, the 
National Marine Fisheries Service issued an “incidental take statement” 
allowing the Navy to take several species with the use of MFA sonar.86  
Lastly, the Navy completed a lengthy environmental assessment (EA) in 
                                                                                                             
submarines can operate on battery power alone, which essentially eliminates machinery noise mak-
ing them nearly impossible to detect with passive sonar alone.  While the range of a diesel-electric 
submarine is less than that of a nuclear-powered one, the stealth and cost advantages make the di-
esel-electric submarines attractive warships for militaries with fewer resources than the United 
States. 
 78. Countries that operate quiet diesel-electric submarines in the Western Pacific and Indian 
Oceans include China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and India.  JANE’S FIGHTING SHIPS 
2008–2009 (Commodore Stephen Saunders ed., 2008). 
 79. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 73, at 5. 
 80. Training and qualification on sonar systems are required of any submarine officer.  Any 
error in this simplified explanation of sonar operation is the author’s alone. 
 81. Such alternative uses of active sonar are generally met through the use of high frequency 
active sonar rather than MFA sonar. 
 82. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 73, at 5. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. at 6.  Under the CZMA, any federal agency undertaking any development program 
within the coastal zone of a state shall ensure that the action is compliant with the state’s resource 
management program.  16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(C) (2006). 
 85. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 73, at 7. 
 86. Id. at 8. 
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accordance with NEPA.87  The EA concluded that the Navy’s use of 
MFA sonar would not significantly impact the environment, making a 
full EIS unnecessary.88 
Despite the Navy’s attempts to meet each applicable environmental 
law’s requirements, several environmental protection advocates, includ-
ing the Natural Resources Defense Council and Jean-Michel Cousteau, 
filed a claim alleging violations of ESA, CZMA, and most importantly 
NEPA.89  The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the 
use of MFA sonar during the integrated training exercises.90 
2.  Procedural Background 
While the procedural history of the case is complex, the district 
court essentially granted the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction in part, but 
withheld relief under the ESA claim due to little likelihood of success.91  
The district court decided that there was probable success on the merits 
for both the NEPA claim—that the Navy failed to perform an EIS—and 
the CZMA claim—that the Navy’s filing with the California Coastal 
Commission did not adequately account for the planned use of MFA so-
nar.92 
While the injunction was on appeal, the Navy attempted to achieve 
exemption from both the CZMA and NEPA for national security rea-
sons.93  The CEQ approved alternative arrangements that would allow 
the Navy to continue use of MFA sonar without completing an EIS, 
which in turn would effectively negate the NEPA claim.94  That same 
day, President Bush granted an exemption from the CZMA requirements 
because completion of the exercises was in the “paramount interests of 
the United States.”95 
Before hearing appellate arguments, the Ninth Circuit remanded the 
case to the district court to consider these executive actions.96  The dis-
trict court questioned the constitutionality of the President’s exemption 
from the CZMA but ultimately upheld the injunction on the basis of the 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 8–9. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
 89. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 660–62 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 365 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 661. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 73, at 14–15. 
 94. Winter, 518 F.3d at 661.  Under NEPA, the CEQ is allowed to make alternate arrangements 
with a federal agency when emergency circumstances make compliance with the Act’s requirements 
impossible.  40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2006). 
 95. Brief for the Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 73, at 14. 
 96. Id. at 15. 
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NEPA claim.97  The court concluded that the CEQ’s alternative arrange-
ments were invalid absent an emergency situation authorizing such ac-
tion.98  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the 
injunction on the same grounds.99 
3.  The Exposure of Current Statutory Shortfalls 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, 
holding that the Navy’s need to conduct realistic training exercises out-
weighed the plaintiffs’ interests in marine mammal protection.100  While 
the Court’s decision is intriguing on many levels, it is particularly useful 
in exposing the problems within the current framework of environmental 
law exemptions. 
The Supreme Court focused its decision on three key factual issues: 
first, the veracity of the claim that MFA sonar undeniably harms marine 
mammals; second, the potential environmental harm required to trigger 
an EIS in lieu of an environmental assessment in accordance with NEPA; 
and third, the propriety of a federal district court judge halting the opera-
tions of such a complex naval exercise.101  After stating that irreparable 
injury to a plaintiff must be likely (rather than possible) to warrant an 
injunction,102 the majority criticized the lower courts for failing to ade-
quately consider the public interest in national defense.103  The Court 
                                                 
 97. Winter, 518 F.3d at 661.  While the district court expressed concern over the constitutional-
ity of the President’s actions (essentially describing it as executive review of a judicial decision), the 
court did not make a final decision on the constitutionality of the CZMA claim.  Id.  None of the 
higher courts took up the issue; it remains no more than a passing comment in this litigation.  Id.  
Interestingly, the exemption allowed within the CZMA is explicitly granted to the President “[a]fter 
any final judgment, decree, or order of any Federal court that is appealable.”  16 U.S.C. § 
1456(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 98. Winter, 518 F.3d at 661. 
 99. Id. at 687, 703. 
 100. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 382. 
 101. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 129 S. 
Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239).  While discussion of each issue merits time and effort, this Comment 
focuses only on the argument that the Supreme Court is not the most efficient venue for these dis-
cussions.  See infra Part IV. 
 102. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375.  Squarely at issue here are the merits of the claims that MFA 
sonar will harm marine mammals.  Id.  Reasonable scientific minds have disagreed on the likelihood 
that active sonar emissions will injure marine mammals.  However, the Supreme Court (at least 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Breyer) seemed to place 
significant weight on the fact that similar naval exercises in SOCAL during the previous forty years 
showed no documented cases of sonar-induced injuries.  See id. 
 103. Id. at 376 (“[E]ven if plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm from the Navy’s training 
exercises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective, 
realistic training of its sailors.  A proper consideration of these factors alone requires denial of the 
requested injunctive relief.”). 
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held that the balancing of equities tipped strongly in favor of the Navy 
because “forcing the Navy to deploy an inadequately trained antisubma-
rine force jeopardizes the safety of the fleet . . . and the President—the 
Commander in Chief—has determined that training with active sonar is 
essential to national security.”104 
The Winter decision brought to light several significant failings as-
sociated with granting environmental law exemptions to the military.  
First, although the district court opined that the President’s waiver of the 
CZMA was unconstitutional, the constitutionality of such executive ac-
tion was never addressed due to the validity of the NEPA claim.105  Had 
NEPA been written with a national security exemption, the constitutio-
nality of the President’s waiver could have been decided.106  As written, 
however, the nation’s environmental laws do not promote a clear and 
unified policy regarding the balancing of national security interests. 
Second, despite the Navy’s best efforts to comply with the statutory 
exemptions as written, it was still forced to defend against the plaintiffs’ 
ESA and CZMA claims.107  Because the statutes that authorize environ-
mental law exemptions each have different requirements and citizen suit 
provisions, the military will experience a revolving door of litigation 
whenever it plans a large-scale training operation.108 
Third, the ability of a single district court judge to enjoin a naval 
exercise that is reportedly necessary for national defense tends to gener-
ate uneasiness.  While judges are frequently required to make determina-
tive rulings on issues they lack expertise on, the costs of misjudging the 
import of naval operations is considerably greater when their rulings 
have significant effects on the safety and security of the nation.109 
                                                 
 104. Id. at 378 (internal citation omitted). 
 105. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
365 (2008). 
 106. Presumably, the district court would have found any waiver of NEPA to be just as un-
constitutional as the CZMA waiver.  The district court was concerned with separation of powers, in 
that the President’s actions constituted an executive reversal of a judicial decision.  Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. This is not to say that judicial review is never appropriate when the military successfully 
obtains an exemption from environmental laws.  However, as will be discussed infra in Part IV, the 
compartmentalization and specificity of environmental laws leads to this form of litigation, which 
imposes significant time and resource burdens on the government. 
 109. Justice Breyer expressed his concern as follows: 
Look, I don’t know anything about this.  I’m not a naval officer.  But if I see an admiral 
come along with an affidavit that says—on its face it’s plausible—that you’ve got to train 
people . . . or there will be subs hiding there with all kinds of terrible weapons, and he 
swears that under oath.  And I see on the other side a district judge who just says, you’re 
wrong . . . . I know that district judge doesn’t know about it, either. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 101, at 35. 
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Finally, partially due to the previous three problems, the federal 
court system is not the proper venue to resolve these issues.  In announc-
ing the Court’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts made the exact same de-
termination that the district court could have—the Commander in Chief 
determined that this training was of paramount interest to national securi-
ty.110  It seems implausible that such an easy determination, resting not 
on the discretion of necessarily biased military leaders or factually li-
mited judges, but on the determination of the Commander in Chief, 
would require the Supreme Court to resolve. 
These are the problems, brought to the forefront of the discussion as 
a result of Winter, that the next Part will attempt to redress. 
IV.  RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
As discussed above, the current framework of statutory exemptions 
provided in environmental laws is inadequate, inconsistent, and ineffi-
cient.111  How then should the Legislature uphold the force of each envi-
ronmental statute while allowing the armed forces to adequately prepare 
for battle?  The first step is to acknowledge that operational encroach-
ment exists.  Next, an appropriate venue must be designated to resolve 
the inevitable issues that arise when military objectives and environmen-
tal protection collide.  Lastly, that venue must have a clear standard to 
apply in order to fairly and uniformly settle disputes with national securi-
ty implications. 
A.  Does Operational Encroachment Actually Exist? 
Operational encroachment can be a difficult concept to quantify—
there will inherently be arguments that it does not exist at all.112  Several 
factors listed below help to explain why the effects of operational en-
croachment are difficult to quantify, and they have been used as argu-
ments that operational encroachment does not in fact exist.113 
                                                 
 110. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 378. 
 111. It should be acknowledged that environmental laws have contributed greatly to the na-
tional conscience and have effectively forced federal agencies to consider the environmental conse-
quences of their decisions.  In no small part, that is due to the citizen suit provisions of the various 
statutes and the courts’ willingness to hold agencies accountable.  However, while the courts look to 
balance the agency’s interests against environmental protection interests, the weight given to the 
agency’s interest is fundamentally different when national security concerns are implicated. 
 112. One must ask: If the military cannot specify how much training time is lost as a result of 
court-ordered injunctions and what impact that loss has on readiness, then how can operational en-
croachment possibly exist?  See infra, note 113. 
 113. Some argue that the lack of quantifiable proof offered to Congress through military testi-
mony shows that encroachment issues, if not fantasy in toto, are severely exaggerated.  See Cathe-
rine M. Vogel, Military Readiness and Environmental Security—Can They Co-Exist?, 39 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 315, 340 (2004) (“[T]he lack of a nexus between the modified training scena-
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The primary problem with accurately gauging the military’s readi-
ness is the availability of information.  Due to the nature of the military’s 
command structure, those answering congressional inquiries into realistic 
training are not the soldiers and sailors who must receive the training or 
even the unit commanders responsible for directing those soldiers and 
sailors.114  While senior military leadership routinely relies on reports 
from “deck plate”115 subordinates, their testimony inherently cannot ad-
dress the specific issues confronting individual unit commanders.116  Fur-
thermore, it is possible that senior military leadership may be unwilling 
to admit to training weaknesses for tactical, strategic, or personal rea-
sons.117 
Additionally, the military faces the problem of defining a metric to 
measure the levels of encroachment.  Readiness levels are subjective by 
nature, and in a world where traditional military capabilities such as anti-
submarine warfare, mine warfare, or antisurface warfare are highly pe-
rishable,118 there is no clear line between being ready and not being ready 
for war.  This is evidenced by Chief Justice Roberts’s response in Winter 
to the Ninth Circuit’s proposal that the Navy could return to the courts if 
it could prove an inability to train naval forces: “This is cold comfort to 
the Navy . . . .  [W]e do not think the Navy is required to wait until the 
injunction actually results in an inability to train . . . .  By then it may be 
too late.”119 
                                                                                                             
rio and a quantitative reduction in readiness ability weakens the DOD’s argument.”).  See also Ste-
phen Dycus, Osama’s Submarine: National Security and Environmental Protection After 9/11, 30 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9–10 (2005) (citing military successes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq by forces trained under restrictive environmental laws as further evidence of the inexistence of 
operational encroachment). 
 114. For instance, the officers called in to testify about operational encroachment were all flag 
officers—i.e.,generals and admirals.  See supra, note 65; Bethurem, supra note 4, at 122. 
 115. “Deck plate” is a term used to refer to sailors at the lowest levels of command; those 
maintaining and operating the ship’s equipment.  They are the ones who actually see the effects of 
training, or lack thereof, because their feet are literally on the deck plates. 
 116. For instance, a naval commanding officer is the only one aware of the capabilities of his 
or her crew at any given time; operational capabilities are affected by rapidly changing factors such 
as personnel turnover, equipment malfunction, or training artificialities created by externalities. 
 117. After all, a fundamental trait of the military is to hold the highest-ranking officer account-
able for every aspect of readiness.  Thus, strike group commanders are not likely to admit that their 
forces are susceptible to attack from a diesel-electric submarine, not only for obvious tactical reasons 
but also for the purpose of improving sailors’ morale and their own reputations (regardless of the 
paucity of training opportunities for the group’s combatants). 
 118. The skills required for such specialty warfare lead to a considerably higher level and 
intensity of training prior to deployment.  This is due not only to deployment certification but also to 
the concern of watchteam cohesion and operator skill that are affected by the high rate of crew turn-
over on naval warships. 
 119. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 380–81 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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In light of the difficulty of measuring levels of operational en-
croachment, Congress’s reaction to claims of operational encroachment 
provides additional credence to the military’s claims.  Congress has dis-
tinguished between military objectives and objectives of other federal 
agencies by providing national security exemptions in most environmen-
tal statutes120 and, more recently, by making military activities exempt 
from most provisions of certain environmental acts.121  After Congress 
rejected the Military Environmental Responsibility Act,122 the shift in 
Congress’s attitude towards environmental lawsuits involving the mili-
tary is evident.  Recent notable lawsuits,123 testimony from senior DOD 
personnel,124 and political pressure125 led to more discretion being 
handed to military authorities to balance environmental concerns with 
training objectives without the threat of judicial second-guessing.  If 
there is any congressional trend to be ascertained, it is that the current 
laws are not meant to completely frustrate the military’s training exercis-
es. 
Adding to the debate on the existence of operational encroachment 
are discussions regarding the effects of 9/11 and the nation’s reaction to 
the war on terrorism.  Critics of the post-9/11 weakening of certain envi-
ronmental laws argue that it was an opportunistic exploitation of the na-
tion’s fear of another terrorist attack.  This theory shifts the focus from 
the true issue—shrinking possibilities for realistic training—by playing 
into political emotions.  It is easier for critics to dismiss the DOD’s con-
cerns regarding encroachment when those concerns are connected to a 
president’s largely unpopular administration.126  These critics attribute 
any military gains since 9/11 to congressional acquiescence during a time 
                                                 
 120. See supra Part II.A. 
 121. Babcock, supra note 38, at 127–30.  In the FY04 and FY05 versions of the National De-
fense Authorization Acts, Congress attached riders that significantly limited the applicability of the 
MBTA, the MMPA, and the ESA to military readiness activities.  Id.  Several articles analyze these 
changes as an exploitation of the atmosphere of national fear in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.  See, 
e.g., Dycus, supra note 113. 
 122. See supra, note 71. 
 123. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (enjoining the 
Navy from use of Low Frequency Active sonar because of potential harm to marine mammals under 
the ESA, the MMPA, and NEPA); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. 
D.C. 2002) (enjoining the Navy and Air Force from using a bombing range on a small island near 
Guam because bombing runs caused unintentional takes of migratory bird species protected under 
the MBTA). 
 124. See Hearing on Continuing Encroachment, supra note 40. 
 125. See supra, notes 66, 69, and accompanying text. 
 126. In October 2008, at the time of the decision announced in Winter, gallup polls showed 
President George W. Bush’s approval rating at 25%, the lowest since 1952.  Frank Newport, Bush 
Job Approval at 25%, His Lowest Yet, GALLUP, Oct. 6, 2008, www.gallup.com/poll/110980/Bush-
Job-Approval-25-Lowest-Yet.aspx (last visited July 6, 2009). 
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of national uncertainty and vulnerability.127  The encroachment issue, 
however, has little, if anything, to do with the war on terror.  Any rele-
vant discussion on the merits of the DOD’s claims of encroachment must 
be detached from this politically and emotionally charged undercur-
rent.128 
As stated above, the difficulty in measuring operational encroach-
ment levels supports the position that action to curtail encroachment is 
unnecessary.  However, if Congress can recognize that encroachment 
poses real problems with training the armed forces, despite the lack of 
quantifiable proof, they can propose an adequate resolution to deal with 
the problem. 
B.  Where Should These Decisions Be Made? 
Once it has been established that operational encroachment exists, 
the Legislature must determine the appropriate venue to resolve the in-
evitable conflicts between the military and environmental activists.  This 
Comment does not argue for a removal of all forms of military accounta-
bility when it comes to environmental harms.  National defense and envi-
ronmental protection are similarly cherished values for the nation, and 
neither should completely subjugate the other.  Rather, this Comment 
calls for a more fair and impartial balancing of the United States’ envi-
ronmental conservation interests and its national defense interests. 
Due to the limitations of the federal court system, the federal courts 
should not be the first arbiter when these conflicts arise.  Instead, a fed-
eral executive commission should be formed to adjudge these matters.  
An executive commission would have several benefits over the federal 
courts. 
First, an executive commission would provide the level of expertise 
that is required to fully appreciate and weigh the competing interests in 
these conflicts.  Take Winter as an example.129  The likelihood of injury 
to marine mammals resulting from the Navy’s use of MFA sonar is an 
important consideration, but there are significant scientific materials that 
                                                 
 127. Babcock, supra note 38, at 120–26.  In an article intended to describe the diminished 
effect of environmental laws on military training operations, the author devotes a significant portion 
of her argument to a discussion of the PATRIOT Act and various infringements on civil liberties 
under sweeping executive powers.  Id. 
 128. Commentary analyzing the Navy’s use of active sonar is a clear example of reducing real 
operational constraints into this construct.  Professor Dycus’ choice of title for the discussion regard-
ing the effects of sonar on mammals evokes this connection.  Dycus, supra note 113, at 29.  Of 
course, the Navy does not contend that training with MFA sonar will assist in locating Osama bin 
Laden or on preventing the next attack staged by Al Qaeda.  Yet, the title of the article, Osama’s 
Submarine, connotes just that proposition, thereby belittling the actual claim that MFA sonar train-
ing is needed to enhance the Navy’s defense against more traditional enemy forces.  See id. 
 129. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
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support both parties’ contentions.130  Similarly, the need for an unre-
stricted ability to engage in MFA sonar emissions during a large-scale 
training exercise is equally important, but parties differ as to what miti-
gation measures could be taken to provide for realistic training.  Both 
considerations require close examination of facts that are most likely un-
familiar to a federal judge. 
A commission comprised of multiple experts would better resolve 
these factual disputes because it would have more time and expertise 
than the court system allows.  While not every commissioner can be an 
expert in biology, ecology, and military training, the combined know-
ledge and expertise of the commissioners can strike the right balance—
for example, a five-member panel consisting of two national security 
experts, two scientific experts, and a neutral adjudicator.  Congressional 
ratification of commission appointments would hold the Executive 
Branch accountable for filling vacant spots with qualified and capable 
minds.131 
Second, an executive commission would resolve the inconsistencies 
in the current framework of exemptions.  If one administrative body han-
dled each exemption, the military could request all foreseeable exemp-
tions from one party at the same time, reducing the time and expense of 
obtaining each individual exemption.  Additionally, any opposing parties 
would be able to present their arguments and contradictory evidence, just 
like they can at a trial.  The commission could relax the rules of evi-
dence, allowing for access to more evidence than at a traditional trial, to 
attempt the best result. 
Third, the administrative structure of the commission would allow 
for greater flexibility and efficiency in making such factually complex 
decisions.  The establishment of the new commission would not require 
significant legislative debate about form and structure because the com-
mission would not be experimental in nature.  A commission operated in 
this manner would be largely subject to the Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA),132 allowing Congress to determine several aspects of 
how the decisions should be made and reviewed.  The commission’s 
enabling act would (1) determine how much deference reviewing courts 
would grant to the commission (most likely the “arbitrary and capri-
                                                 
 130. For analysis that minimizes the risk to marine mammals see Brief for the Petitioner-
Appellant, supra note 75, at 7–8.  But see Michael Jasny et al., Sounding the Depths II: The Rising 
Toll of Sonar, Shipping, and Industrial Ocean Noise on Marine Life, NAT’L RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL REP. (NRDC/Marine Mammal Prot. Project, New York, N.Y.) Nov. 2005, available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sound/sound.pdf (last visited July 26, 2009). 
 131. Senate confirmation would be required under the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 
2, cl. 2. 
 132. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
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cious” standard of review),133 and (2) allow for informal adjudication.134  
Informal adjudication has the advantage of avoiding the time-consuming 
requirements found in formal adjudication.135  This type of conflict reso-
lution circumvents the more complicated and controversial legal deter-
minations in the federal courts regarding how much deference to grant 
military leaders and the court’s willingness to oppose the military or the 
current Administration.136 
The obvious drawback to a newly formed commission would be 
diminishing the President’s influence on granting exemptions.  Under the 
current statutory schemes, the President is typically the one with the au-
thority to exempt an agency from statutory compliance.  (This power 
undeniably stems from the President’s Commander-in-Chief constitu-
tional mandate.)  By authorizing a commission to grant exemptions, even 
one staffed by presidential appointees, some of the President’s powers 
would be delegated to an administrative body. 
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to address the separation of 
powers concerns voiced by the Ninth Circuit in Winter.137  However, it is 
worth noting that of any one person, the President is uniquely situated to 
make determinations regarding national security, particularly when it 
comes to the problem of operational encroachment.  Despite the Presi-
dent’s unique position, final authority does not have to rest with that of-
fice alone.  The President may exert significant influence over the new 
commission through appointment; presumably, a president that desires a 
stronger emphasis on environmental preservation will appoint members 
similarly inclined, and vice versa.  Therefore, the President would not 
completely relinquish the power to grant exemptions to military activi-
ties, even though the official decision would come from a commission. 
As with Executive appointments to other administrative commis-
sions, there would likely be significant political infighting during the 
confirmation process.  Appointments might be viewed as a way to curry 
favor with congressional committees, rather than as an attempt to nomi-
nate the most skilled and able administrators.  Under this view, complex 
cases that require balancing environmental concerns with national securi-
                                                 
 133. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 134. Id. § 555. 
 135. Id. §§ 556–557. 
 136. In fact, this new system could avoid questions such as those posed by Justice Alito in 
Winter: “Isn’t there something incredibly odd about a single district judge making a determination 
on that defense question that is contrary to the determination that the Navy has made?”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 30, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-
1239). 
 137. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 
365 (2008). 
250 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:229 
ty would be better decided by an impartial federal judge.  While there 
may be no way to completely avoid political cronyism and posturing, 
requiring five commissioners of varied backgrounds to undergo a public 
nomination and confirmation process (similar to that enacted for judicial 
nominees) would provide the fairest process that our government can 
muster. 
Although national defense and environmental protection are subject 
to lobbying from interest groups as much as any other field, objective 
outsiders would ensure that the commission was not subject to industry 
capture.  Any time that an administrative decision-making body loses 
impartiality or neutrality, it is possible that one interest group has effec-
tively “captured” the commission and can influence decisions in its fa-
vor.  Under the proposed model, in addition to the checks imposed by 
requiring Senate approval of appointments, the possibility of industry 
capture would be offset by the diverse professional and intellectual back-
grounds of the commissioners. 
C.  What Should the Guiding Standard Be? 
Ultimately, even if a new commission is formed to adjudicate these 
conflicts, it will only be as effective as the standards that guide it.  The 
current variations in environmental statutes do not constitute a clear and 
uniform approach to issues of national security.138  Three potential op-
tions could resolve this issue.  However, each would require substantial 
legislative effort and would most likely meet significant political opposi-
tion. 
First, the Legislature could combine all current environmental laws 
into one comprehensive statute with standard enforcement provisions, 
including applicability and exemptions.  There are obvious drawbacks to 
such an endeavor: it would take extreme legislative muscle; there are 
inherent differences and nuances amongst the various environmental law 
statutes; and innumerable interested parties would lobby for their own 
interests.  However, a comprehensive statute would not only be more 
efficient (because all regulations and requirements would be located in 
one authority), but also more authoritative.  Instead of having either a 
specific enforcement statute or an aspirational policy objective (like 
NEPA’s mandate for federal agencies to consider the environmental ef-
fects of their actions), the nation would have one clear policy-based law 
with bite.  Despite any possible benefits, the political cooperation re-
quired to draft and pass such a bill makes this option, at best, a hypothet-
ical reserved for law school discussion. 
                                                 
 138. See supra Part II.C. 
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Under the second option, in lieu of an environmental super-statute, 
Congress could amend NEPA to allow for a national security exemption.  
As it stands now, NEPA is alone in disregarding the potential for conflict 
between procedural compliance and national security.139  For a statute 
that supposedly states the nation’s overall policy towards environmental 
stewardship, it is strange that NEPA remains silent on national security.  
Because it is clear that national security and environmental protection are 
occasionally at odds, an exemption is needed to signal a clear legislative 
intent to resolve these issues. 
Some may argue that there is no need to form an exemption from 
NEPA because NEPA does not proscribe activity but rather requires an 
impact analysis to determine the level of harm expected from the pro-
posed activity.140  Furthermore, in true emergency situations, NEPA al-
ready excuses compliance.141  The procedural history of Winter, howev-
er, indicates that NEPA no longer wears the label of all form and no sub-
stance.  Rather, NEPA is a powerful judicial tool for halting military 
training exercises.142 
One can imagine a scenario where agency action will cause envi-
ronmental harm, national security will be a predominant interest, but the 
circumstances do not fit the definition of an “emergency situation.”143  
Under the current NEPA framework, the agency would be forced to un-
dergo the resource intensive EIS process or risk standing in violation of 
federal law.  Even though altering NEPA at this stage would raise the ire 
of many, this option is much more viable than the first and at least pro-
vides the potential for resolving some conflicts in the future. 
The third option, perhaps the easiest to reach in terms of conveni-
ence, would surely raise the hackles of many environmental coalitions 
that have struggled for years to hold the DOD accountable for actions 
that harm the environment.  Legislation could be proposed that would 
provide one blanket rule regarding exemptions from all environmental 
statutes for national security reasons.144  This proposal satisfies the need 
                                                 
 139. See supra Part II.B. 
 140. See Caldwell, supra note 28. 
 141. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2006). 
 142. See Winter, 518 F.3d 658. 
 143. Such scenarios are probably most apparent in the realm of homeland security.  Whether 
the situation was to involve underwater sensor installation near ports, increased Jeep patrols along 
the border, or improved physical security barriers at commercial nuclear power plants, homeland 
security regulations could require agencies to act faster than possible if completing an EIS. 
 144. But see supra Part III.A.  This idea would be the foil to the Military Environmental Re-
sponsibility Act.  The proposed bill would address each issue present when these conflicts arise—
such as likelihood of environmental harm, necessity of the military objective, and potential classifi-
cation and confidentiality issues—in one set of regulations applied uniformly to each environmental 
statute. 
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to provide a uniform application of environmental laws to the military, 
and it would allow the exempting body to weigh all factors (including all 
potential harms under the various environmental protection laws) against 
the national security interests.  By streamlining the process, not only 
could the military plan training scenarios more efficiently and reliably, 
but judicial economy would also benefit because there would be one fac-
tual balancing conducted under a single statute on review. 
While the requisite congressional effort may be less with this option 
than the first one, any such bill would still be met with significant oppo-
sition.  Providing a bill streamlining the exemption process for military 
activities would likely be seen as a return to the Cold War era mindset of 
military might at all costs.  Similar to the opposition to option one, critics 
would argue that bundling each environmental law together undercuts 
the effectiveness of each statute.  For example, the CWA may require a 
different standard to overcome an exemption than the ESA, and so on.  
Additionally, environmental protection groups might rely on the current 
inefficiencies of the system as a tool to hinder military operations, if not 
to halt them altogether.  However, from a meta-approach to balancing 
national security and environmental concerns, the specifics of each sta-
tute are not as important as the decisive tipping of the scales.  If a com-
mission, agency, or court determines that national security is paramount, 
then the proposed activity should be exempted from each applicable sta-
tute.  This form of efficiency would greatly streamline the process, sav-
ing resources for both the military and the courts. 
Any of the three proposed options would be an improvement on the 
current system.  Due to the scope of legislation required, option one 
seems unrealistic, even if the end result would be the most efficient sys-
tem.  With option two or three, future litigation can be avoided, or at 
least minimized, without sacrificing the necessary balancing of compet-
ing interests. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Operational encroachment threatens the military’s ability to ade-
quately simulate combat scenarios during necessary training operations 
for the soldiers and sailors who may be thrust into harm’s way.  The per-
petuation of operational encroachment is supported by the current statu-
tory scheme of environmental laws and is an unnecessary hindrance to 
proper military interests in defending our national security.  Due to in-
consistencies and inefficiencies in the current laws, the government is 
forced to conduct lengthy and costly litigation to satisfy each environ-
mental statute. 
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This problem is evident in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, where the Supreme Court was called upon to reverse an injunc-
tion that prevented the Navy from maximizing training operations with 
MFA sonar.145  Had a different framework been in place in January 2007, 
the ensuing litigation could have been avoided and the same results 
reached.  If all environmental laws had been combined into one super-
statute, NEPA had been crafted with a national security exemption, or 
the military had been able to utilize a separate exemption statute with 
authority over each environmental law, the Navy could have adequately 
planned its training operations.  If the Navy could have then proposed its 
case for the use of MFA sonar in SOCAL to an executive commission 
consisting of both national security and environmental experts, the com-
mission could have issued a single decision subject only to limited judi-
cial review as defined by Congress. 
Incorporating these proposed changes to the current framework of 
environmental law is necessary for the military to maintain operational 
capability.  Because military operations and environmental statutes will 
always be somewhat at odds, a streamlined process is required to pro-
mote efficiency and consistency in the dispute resolution process.  Only 
then will operational encroachment be limited and an appropriate balance 
struck between environmental protection and a strong national defense. 
                                                 
 145. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
